Responsibility to Protect: A Comparative Analysis of Kenya and Sudan

by Luca Virdis and Sara Ceschin

1. Introduction

Kenya and Sudan represent two of the most emblematic cases of political and ethnic violence in Africa during the first decade of the 21st century. Although geographically close and both shaped by colonial legacies, the two countries experienced very different trajectories in terms of state stability, governance, and response to internal crises.

In Kenya, long considered a model of relative stability in East Africa, the disputed presidential elections of December 2007 triggered a wave of violence that revealed the deep ethnic and political divisions within the country. The confrontation between supporters of Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga quickly evolved into widespread clashes among ethnic groups — mainly Kikuyu, Luo, and Kalenjin — resulting in more than a thousand deaths, hundreds of thousands of displaced people, and massive destruction of property. What began as an electoral dispute soon became a crisis of national cohesion that challenged Kenya’s image as a democratic success story in the region.

Sudan, by contrast, had already been marked by decades of civil war between the North and South, and by chronic instability in its western region of Darfur. In 2003, the rebellion in Darfur against President Omar al-Bashir’s government was met with an extremely violent counterinsurgency campaign led by the Sudanese army and the Janjaweed militia. Entire villages were razed, civilians were massacred, and systematic sexual violence was used as a weapon of war. The conflict in Darfur caused hundreds of thousands of deaths and forced millions to flee their homes, creating one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises of the early 2000s.

Despite the different political contexts, both Kenya and Sudan illustrate the complex relationship between ethnic identity, state power, and international intervention. They reveal how internal political disputes can escalate into large-scale violence when combined with ethnic polarization and weak institutions, and how the international community responds — sometimes decisively, sometimes inadequately — to crises that threaten human security. 

It is through the comparison of these two cases that the effectiveness and the contradictions of the so-called “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) can be fully understood.

2. The Case of Kenya (2007–2008)

In December 2007, Mwai Kibaki was re-elected president of Kenya in a highly contested election against opposition leader Raila Odinga. Allegations of electoral fraud sparked widespread violence across the country, resulting in 1,133 deaths, over 900 sexual assaults, 600,000 displaced persons, and 110,000 destroyed properties — particularly in the Rift Valley, Mombasa, and urban settlements in Nairobi. The violence took on an ethnic dimension, with clashes between Kikuyu, Luo, and Kalenjin groups. Victims were often targeted for their perceived ethnic affiliation or political support. Police forces, militias, and armed civilians all played a role, and hate speech during the campaign period had further fueled the divisions.

The international community reacted swiftly. Under the leadership of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the African Union, mediation led to the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement in February 2008, which established a coalition government. The International Criminal Court (ICC) later classified the post-election violence as crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, Kenya became a rare example of R2P success: a case where rapid diplomatic engagement — rather than military intervention — prevented escalation into genocide.

In the following years, with international support, the Kenyan government introduced institutional reforms in the security, judiciary, and electoral sectors, and took steps to curb impunity and hate speech. As Karari (2020) observes, “the speed at which the international community intervened in the Kenyan crisis differs with the reluctance to intervene witnessed in Rwanda and Darfur.” The U.S. and EU viewed Kenya as “too important to fail” due to its economic, strategic, and geopolitical significance in the region.

3. The Case of Sudan/Darfur (2003–2005)

In 2003, rebellion erupted in Sudan’s Darfur region against President Omar al-Bashir’s government, which responded with a brutal military campaign. The Sudanese Armed Forces and the Arab Janjaweed militia conducted widespread killings, mass rapes, and the destruction of villages belonging mainly to the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups. The conflict resulted in approximately 300,000 deaths and millions of internally displaced people. Despite early warnings, the international community’s response was slow and fragmented. Only in 2005 did the UN Security Council refer the situation to the ICC, impose sanctions, and authorize the hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping mission (UNAMID).

Karari (2020) notes that in Darfur, “the international community assumed the conspiracy of not to see.” Strategic interests — including oil exploitation, military cooperation, and the fear of jeopardizing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan — delayed intervention. The Sudanese government invoked national sovereignty to resist external pressure, while China and Russia blocked stronger action in the Security Council. The outcome was a clear failure of R2P: protection of civilians was subordinated to geopolitical calculations and power rivalries among major actors.

4. Double Standards and the Limits of R2P

The comparison between Kenya and Darfur exposes the double standards in the application of R2P. While international inaction in Darfur allowed mass atrocities to unfold, Kenya benefited from a rapid and coordinated intervention. As Karari (2020) argues, “all animals are equal, but some are more equal than others” — R2P seems to function best where powerful states have strategic or economic interests.

In theory, R2P aspires to be a universal ethical norm; in practice, it often behaves as a selective political instrument. The lack of sanctions for non-compliance, vague criteria for intervention, and the absence of binding enforcement mechanisms undermine its credibility.

5. Lessons Learned and African Perspectives

Several lessons emerge from the comparison between Kenya and Sudan. Preventive diplomacy and dialogue are more effective and less costly than military action. The legitimacy of R2P depends on its impartial and timely implementation. Strengthening Africa’s own mechanisms for conflict prevention and human rights protection is essential.

In this context, the principle of “African Solutions to African Problems” (AfSol), promoted by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) and the African Union, represents a step forward. Karari (2020) proposes the JETLINERS-RIGS model — an integrated African framework for justice, governance, institutional reform, civic education, and intercommunity dialogue — as a means of building a continental culture of human protection less dependent on external actors.

6. Conclusion

The Kenyan experience shows that the Responsibility to Protect can succeed when the international community acts swiftly and when domestic actors cooperate. By contrast, Darfur reveals the shortcomings of a selective and interest-driven application of the principle, constrained by sovereignty claims and political divisions. For R2P to become a genuinely universal norm, it must overcome double standards and be grounded in solidarity, impartiality, and timely action. As Kofi Annan remarked in 2008, “Kenya has shown that prevention is possible.” Yet as long as the value of human life depends on a state’s strategic importance, the promise of R2P will remain, as in Darfur, an unfulfilled one.

Bibliography

African Union. (2008). Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation: Agreements and Results. Addis Ababa: AU Commission.

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (n.d.). Kenya. Retrieved from https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/kenya/

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2023). Twenty Years of the Responsibility to Protect and the Unfulfilled Promise in Darfur. Retrieved from https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). (2001). The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.

Karari, P. (2020). Responsibility to Protect in Kenyan and Darfur Crises: A Critical Deconstruction of the Ideology of AfSol in the Lens of R2P, Normative International Relations Theory, and the Jetliners-Rigs Approach for Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution. AfSol Journal, 1(1), 161–189.

Pandora Rivista. (2022). La responsabilità di proteggere: promesse e limiti di un principio di intervento umanitario. Retrieved from https://www.pandorarivista.it/articoli/responsabilita-di-proteggere/

United Nations. (2005). World Summit Outcome Document, A/RES/60/1. New York: United Nations.

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Written by Luca Virdis, 3rd year Bachelor's student in Literature at the University of Padova.

Instagram: @lucasvirdis

Research assistance by Sara Ceschin, 1st year Master's student in Government Sciences at the University of Padova.

LinkedIn: Sara Ceschin